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TURKEY, CYPRUS AND THE 
TURKISH CYPRIOT POLITICAL 
PARTIES:THE EPHEMERAL 
CATALYST OF EU?
George Kyris*
The article investigates Turkey’s impact on the Turkish Cypriot political parties 
before, during and after the Annan Plan referenda. It is argued that before 
the referenda on the “Annan Plan”, a variety of reasons (the most important 
being the strong prospects for Turkey’s EU candidacy) led Ankara to support 
a compromising solution to the Cyprus issue. In contrast, in the post-Annan 
era, the slower pace of Turkey’s EU integration as well as the staggering ne-
gotiations on the Cyprus issue have not allowed for an equally decisive role of 
Ankara in Turkish Cypriot political parties
* George Kyris completed his Doctoral Research at the University of Manchester. The author would like to thank Dimitris Papadimitriou 
and the anonymous reviewers for their useful comments in earlier forms of this paper. This research was supported by the Greek 
Scholarship Foundation (IKY) and the University of Manchester.
98
VOLUME 10 NUMBER 2
he Cyprus issue, the long-standing dispute between the Turkish-Cyp-
riot and Greek-Cypriot communities of the Mediterranean island, is 
an important dimension of Turkish foreign policy, and has been since 
the start of the problem. Ankara has maintained strong economic, 
political, social and cultural links with the Turkish Cypriots, providing assistance in 
financial, diplomatic, military and political terms. In this context, Turkish policies, 
especially those related to the Cyprus issue, have affected the Turkish Cypriot 
domestic scene. For years, successive Turkish governments supported Turkish 
Cypriot claims for territorial and political independence. This attitude, however, 
was not helpful for Greek and Turkish Cypriots reaching compromise and solving 
the problem.1 Instead, this stance of Ankara aided the success of Turkish Cypriot 
political elites with rather inflexible positions towards the Cyprus problem, such as 
the Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş and his National Unity Party (Ulusal Birlik 
Partisi-UBP) that dominated Turkish Cypriot politics until recently. However, the 
dawn of the new millennium saw a shift in Turkish policy towards the Cyprus issue, 
which also impacted the Turkish Cypriot political scene in a very interesting way. 
For this to happen, the EU played a catalytic role. 
The Pre-Annan Era: The Emergence of a Catalyst
In late 1990s, the new dynamics created by Turkey’s candidacy for EU member-
ship profoundly affected Ankara’s policy towards Cyprus. The European Council 
Summit in Helsinki 19992 recognized Turkey as a candidate for EU membership. 
However, according to the Presidency conclusions, the criteria for Turkey’s ac-
cession into the EU included the contribution of the Turkish government to the 
resolution of the Cyprus problem. This linkage between the Cyprus issue and 
Turkey’s EU prospects (combined with in the transformation of the Turkish gov-
ernment) evoked a highly flexible Turkish policy towards Cyprus and, ultimately, 
the support of the “Annan Plan”, the UN-constructed plan for the reunification of 
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots under a federal state, first presented in No-
vember 2002. Consequently, this new Turkish policy also had an impact on Turk-
ish Cypriot party competition and contributed to one of the most striking election 
results (parliamentary elections in December 2003, and presidential elections in 
April 2005) in Turkish Cypriot history. 
After its recognition as a candidate for full EU membership (1999), Turkey refrained 
from acknowledging the links between her EU path and the Cyprus issue. In re-
action to the outcome of the Helsinki Summit, the then-Turkish Prime Minister 
Bülent Ecevit stated that “there is no need for our Turkish Cypriot brothers to feel 
GEORGE KYRIS
1 Işıl Kazan “Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean, Seen from Turkey”, The European Union and the Cyprus Conflict: Modern Conflict, 
Postmodern Union (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002).
2 European Council, “Presidency Conclusions”, European Council on 10-11 December, Helsinki. 
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3 “Ecevit addresses TGNA on EU decisions”, Anatolia Agency. 14 December 1999, http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/tcpr/1999/99-12-
15.tcpr.html#01. 
4 “Extract on Cyprus from an exclusive interview with Mesut Yılmaz in Turkish Daily News”, Turkish Daily News. 28 and 29 March 
2002, http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/tcpr/2002/02-03-29.tcpr.html#06,.
5 European Council, “Presidency Conclusions”, European Council on 24-25 June, Corfu. 
the smallest concern; existence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is 
inevitable not only for Turkish Cypriots, but also for Turkey’s security”.3 This state-
ment was indicative of Ankara’s inflexible stance, which continued to support the 
existence of the Turkish Cypriots within 
a separate state. This position contra-
dicted the framework of the interna-
tional community’s efforts for a solu-
tion of the Cyprus problem based on 
a federative formula. Turkey continued 
this policy in the following years. Even 
after the start of fresh negotiations on 
the Cyprus issue between Greek Cyp-
riots and Turkish Cypriots in 2002, the 
Deputy Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz 
renewed Turkish support to Rauf 
Denktaş and reconfirmed Ankara’s po-
sition that “there exist two different na-
tions and two sovereign states in the island.” At the same time, Yılmaz was keen 
to underline that Turkey’s EU membership could not be associated to a settlement 
of the Cyprus Problem.4 
Nevertheless, sweeping changes in Turkey’s political mosaic deeply affected An-
kara’s position towards the long-standing dispute in Cyprus and, therefore, in 
Turkish Cypriot politics. In late 2002, the Prime Minister of AKP (Justice and De-
velopment Party), Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, won the Turkish legislative elections by 
a landslide victory and soon changed Ankara’s policy towards the Mediterranean 
island. The new government clearly favored the reunification of Cyprus based on 
the Annan Plan that was under negotiations during that period. For this change 
of policy, a series of factors played a crucial role. The EU constitutes a recurring 
aspect of these incentives that led Turkey to support this type of solution and the 
Annan Plan. 
First of all, Cyprus’ ongoing EU accession process played an important role in Tur-
key’s policy shift. The way Cyprus’ EU accession would take place was thought to 
have an important impact on Turkey’s interests. Cyprus’ accession process had 
commenced in 1998 and, according to the decisions taken at the European Coun-
cil Summit in Corfu 19945 , the country was set to be included in the next round of 
“The EU’s post-2004 
enlargement fatigue as well as 
its internal crisis related to the 
constitutional reform and the 
Lisbon Treaty considerably 
reduced the speed of 
Turkey’s EU integration.”
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EU enlargement, regardless of achievement of a solution to the bi-communal dis-
pute. Practically, this meant that Cyprus would accede in the administrative face 
of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC), the failed partnership state that was established 
in 1960 and was now monopolized by the Greek Cypriots, but continued to be the 
only internationally recognized administration of the island. The full inclusion of the 
Turkish Cypriot part would be conditional on the resolution of the Cyprus problem 
and the emergence of a new bi-communal state, which would replace the RoC in 
the process of EU integration. 
In this context, a possible accession of Cyprus in the absence of reunification was 
a highly risky option for the Turkish government. This development would have 
offered Greek Cypriots the opportunity to use their bargaining power within EU 
organs to push the candidate Turkey towards more concessions.6 Indeed, after 
the failure of reunification under the Annan Plan and the admission of a Greek 
Cypriot-controlled RoC to the EU in 2004, Greek Cypriots have opportunely used 
their EU membership status to push for 
Turkish compromises on the Cyprus 
issue.7 On the other hand, the entry of 
a united Cyprus would have been very 
beneficial for Ankara itself: firstly, Tur-
key would have an “insider” (Turkish 
Cypriots) within the EU to promote its 
interests and secondly, the accession 
of Cyprus with the Turkish Cypriots 
would have meant the admission of a 
solid Muslim group (one of the biggest 
taboos with regards to Turkey’s accession) into the EU. This could have paved the 
way for Turkey to follow into the EU more easily.8   
In addition, domestic Turkish politics was another contributing factor for Ankara 
to alter her Cyprus policy. The AKP had won the absolute majority of the Turkish 
Parliament, the first party to do so in the span of a decade. That achievement of-
fered the government extended legitimization to pursue radical policy changes, 
including those related to the Cyprus issue.9 Besides, the considerable amount 
“In the post-Annan era, the 
process of resolving the 
Cyprus issue has lost its 
momentum.”
6 Semin Suvarierol, “The Cyprus Obstacle on Turkey’s Road to Membership in the European Union”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 
66. 
7 “Cyprus threatens to veto Turkey talks”, Euractiv, http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/cyprus-threatens-veto-turkey-talks/ar-
ticle-160171, 1 December 2006; “Greek Cypriots may block more chapters in Turkey’s EU negotiations”, Hürriyet, http://www.hurriyet.
com.tr/english/world/10570510.asp, 13 June 2010.
8 F. Stephen Laraabee, “The EU Needs to Rethink its Cyprus Policy”, Survival, Vol. 40, No. 3 (1998), p.7. Despite that the Turkish 
Cypriot society has grown largely secular, it can be argued that their admission to the EU would have played an important symbolic role 
and would have helped Turkey with regards to the religious-related arguments against her accession. 
9 Ayşe Aslıhan Çelenk, “The Restructuring of Turkey’s Policy towards Cyprus: The Justice and Development Party’s Struggle for 
Power”, Turkish Studies, Vol.8 No. 3 (2007), p. 350.
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of skepticism about the AKP’s possible Islamic agenda led Erdoğan to prioritize 
the Cyprus settlement over other matters of Turkish foreign policy, in order to gain 
international support and, through that, fortify his domestic position.10 Finally, the 
government enjoyed important public support for its agenda on Cyprus, given that 
people favored compromises on the condition that they would open the way to-
wards Turkey’s EU membership.11 Indeed, the AKP government managed to shift 
Turkey’s position on the Cyprus problem, one of the ‘“totemic” issues of Turkish 
foreign policy. 
Last but not least, Turkey’s relations with Greece also played a key role for An-
kara’s new and more flexible approach towards the dispute in Cyprus. By the late 
1990s, the two neighboring countries maintained very good relations, as a result 
of a diverse set of reasons. The then-socialist Greek government of Costas Simitis 
pursued a political program which, in foreign matters, aimed at the integration of 
the country’s neighbors into the EU, something which presupposed reconciliation 
with Turkey.12 As a result, a pack of agreements concerning issues such as the 
economy, trade, tourism and people was signed between the two sides of the Ae-
gean.13 Also, the earthquakes, which struck both countries during the year 1999 
and the effect they had on mutual rapprochement, first at a public opinion and, 
then, at a governmental level, should not be underestimated.14 Finally, the role of 
the EU in shaping the relations between the two countries was also very signifi-
cant. Greece’s positive position towards Turkey, which apparently led Turkey to 
be recognized as a candidate for EU membership in the Helsinki Summit (1999) 
was a key strategic move: Athens realized the diplomatic power that it would at-
tain over Greco-Turkish affairs if Turkey’s future became linked to the EU. On the 
other hand, Turkey also understood that the improvement of bilateral relations with 
Greece would contribute to her own EU aspirations. Therefore, the two countries, 
strongly linked by the EU factor, displayed perhaps their brightest moment of co-
operation in recent years. 
The Turkish government’s change of attitude towards the Cyprus issue also im-
pacted the Turkish Cypriot domestic political dynamics. The support of a more 
compromising solution for the Cyprus issue resulted in growing problems between 
Ankara and the then-Turkish Cypriot leadership of Rauf Denktaş, who was skep-
tical about the ongoing UN efforts for mediation in Cyprus based on the Annan 
Plan. Just some days after his election to office and during his first visit to North 
10 Müge Oktay and Emel Kınacıoğlu, “The Domestic Dynamics of Turkey’s Cyprus Policy: Implications for Turkey’s Accession to the 
European Union”, Turkish Studies, Vol.7 No.2 (2007), p. 264.
11 Alexis Heracleides, Cyprus Problem, 1947-2004 (Athens: Sideris, 2006), p. 303.
12 James Ker-Lindsay, “The Policies of Greece and Cyprus towards Turkey’s EU Accession”, Turkish Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2007).
13 H.J. Barkey and P.H. Gordon, “Cyprus: The Predictable Crisis”, The National Interest, Winter 2001-2002 
14 Ayten Gündoğdu, “Identities in Question: Greek-Turkish Relations in a Period of Transformation?”, Middle East Review of Interna-
tional Affairs, Vol.5 No.1 (2001) 
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Cyprus, Turkish Prime Minister Erdoğan started to put more pressure on the Turk-
ish Cypriot leader and suggested that “mutual sacrifices” from both communities 
of the island were required for the achievement of a lasting solution.15 Less than a 
month later, the Turkish Prime Minister moved a step further, when he stated: “I’m 
not in favor of the continuation of the policy that has been maintained in Cyprus 
over the past thirty to forty years […] we will do whatever is required of us; this is 
not Mr. Denktaş’ private matter.”16 
Denktaş’s regime and his party UBP were also facing strong domestic opposi-
tion from various Turkish Cypriot civil society organizations and political parties. 
Through rallies and other public events,17 these civil actors demonstrated their op-
position to the leader and to his inflexible position on the negotiations table, which 
was risking the combined prospects of a solution and EU future for the Turk-
ish Cypriots. The Turkish Prime Minister was very keen to draw attention to this 
mounting Turkish Cypriot public resistance to Denktaş: “This [the rally] is not an 
ordinary event […] you can’t push aside the views of the public. A decision should 
be taken with the largest public participation and should be implemented.” 18 
Erdoğan’s statements are exemplary of the more flexible Turkish rhetoric towards 
the Cyprus problem and Turkey’s denouncement of the hard-line position towards 
the Cyprus issue, along with the Turkish Cypriot elites that represented them. In-
deed, the Turkish Cypriot legislative elections of 2003 saw the defeat of the UBP 
– the party of Denktaş which had monopolized the Turkish Cypriot government 
until that time. The opposition and strongly pro-solution/EU Republican Turkish 
Party (Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi-CTP) won the elections, which were defined by 
extensive support of the forces that favored the Annan Plan and EU membership. 
These results gave renewed justification to the Turkish Prime Minister, who further 
challenged the counterproductive role of Denktaş, who remained the leader of 
Turkish Cypriots and chief of their negotiating team. This position of Ankara was a 
clear support to the Turkish Cypriot political parties which supported solution and 
which were calling for the resignation of the Denktaş from his duties as a negotia-
tor in the Annan Plan.19 The change in the Turkish Cypriot party scene was com-
pleted in 2005, when the CTP was re-elected with increased share of vote, while 
15 “Erdoğan visits the occupied area of Cyprus and says the UN plan is negotiable; Supports simultaneous accession of Cyprus and 
Turkey to the EU”, Hellenic Resources, http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/tcpr/2002/02-11-18.tcpr.html#04, 18 November
16 “Turkey must negotiate on Cyprus, says new leader”, The Independent, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-
must-negotiate-on-cyprus-says-new-leader-601801.html, 3 January 2003.
17 “Turkish Cypriot Call for Reunification”, BBC News, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/2607099.stm, 26 December 2002; 
10.000 “Turkish Cypriots March to Support Annan Plan”, Turkish Press Review, http://www.byegm.gov.tr/YAYINLARIMIZ/CHR/
ING2002/11/02x11x28.HTM#%209, 28 November 2002.
18 “Turkish Cypriot Leader is Criticized by Ankara”, The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/03/world/turkish-cypriot-
leader-is-criticized-by-ankara.html, 3 January 2003.
19 “Mr Talat called on Denktaş to resign during the meeting of the party leaders”, NTV, http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/tcpr/2003/03-
01-03.tcpr.html#02, 2 January 2003.
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its leader Mehmet Ali Talat succeeded 
Denktaş, in what he himself called a 
Turkish Cypriot “silent revolution”.20 
Along these lines, Turkey played a very 
important role in the prevalence of the 
pro-solution/EU parties in Turkish Cyp-
riot politics. Turkey’s compromising 
rhetoric as well as the support that the 
Turkish government provided to the 
Turkish Cypriot opposition forces was 
a crucial reason behind the change of the preferences of the Turkish Cypriot elec-
torate, which remains subject to Turkish discourse and narratives, through the 
various cultural and socio-political links that exist between the two sides. 
The Post-Annan Era: Momentum Lost?
In the post-Annan era, the process of resolving the Cyprus issue has lost its mo-
mentum. In April 2004, 65 percent of Turkish Cypriots approved the Annan Plan, 
but reunification failed as the 76 percent of Greek Cypriots rejected the plan and 
proceeded to join the EU as representatives of the RoC. In the following period, 
the Cyprus problem entered a limbo until 2008, when the emergence of a new and 
more flexible Greek Cypriot leadership in the face of Dimitris Christofias led to the 
reinstatement of new bi-communal negotiations. Despite initial enthusiasm, the 
process of negotiations has so far been slow. This comparative decrease in the 
relevance of the Cyprus problem for the politics of the island has limited Turkey’s 
aptitude to play a decisive role with regards to the Turkish Cypriot political parties 
that support or oppose a compromising solution on the bi-communal dispute. 
What is more, the slow-down of Turkey’s EU accession process has also medi-
ated Ankara’s stance towards the Cyprus issue. Compared to the years when 
Turkey supported a resolution of the dispute which would facilitate her accession 
prospects, Turkey’s stance today is far less fervent. The EU’s post-2004 enlarge-
ment fatigue as well as its internal crisis related to the constitutional reform and 
the Lisbon Treaty 21 considerably reduced the speed of Turkey’s EU integration. In 
addition, the rise of Turko-skeptics among EU circles,22 such as France and Ger-
many, has also slowed down the accession process. Lastly, the Cyprus problem 
itself has posed a very large barrier towards Turkey’s EU aspirations and fast-track 
“…the support of EU 
membership has dropped 
from 62 percent in 2004 to 
47 percent in 2010.”
20 “Pro-EU leader seeks to unify Cyprus”, The New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/18/world/europe/18iht-cyprus.
html?_r=1, 19 April 2005.
21 Attila Eralp, “Temporality, Cyprus Problem and Turkey-EU Relationship”, EDAM Discussion Paper Series 2 (2009).
22 “Sarkozy election win deepens Turkey’s EU gloom”, Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSL0722300620070507, 7 
May 2007.
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progress of integration: as early as 2006, the EU froze eight EU law adoption 
chapters within the negotiations process with Turkey and decided to conclude no 
more (besides the “science and research” chapter, already closed earlier that year) 
before Turkey fully applied the ‘“Additional Protocol” 23, which calls for the open-
ing of Turkish ports to all EU member states, including the Greek Cypriot-led RoC. 
Turkey refuses to apply the protocol as long as Greek Cypriots veto the approval 
of the pending “Direct Trade Regulation”24 , which calls for trade between Turk-
ish Cypriots and the EU member states. The application of the protocol remains 
to this day the official reasoning behind the EU’s reluctance to “unlock” Turkey’s 
accession negotiations. 
This slow-down of Ankara-Brussels relations has also had an important impact on 
domestic Turkish politics and the public attitudes towards the EU. As a result of 
the staggering EU integration progress, the Turkish public has lost their early zeal 
with regards to an EU future: the support of EU membership has dropped from 
62 percent in 2004 25 to 47 percent in 2010.26 In this context, people are less pre-
pared for concessions, such as a more flexible position on the Cyprus issue. The 
consequent empowerment of domestic Turkish nationalist factors has also made 
EU integration a gradually costly option for the AKP government.27 As a result, 
the momentum created in Helsinki 1999 has shrunk and so have the incentives 
provided to Ankara for a decisively contributing position towards the Cyprus issue. 
As a result of the staggering process of negotiations on the Cyprus issue, the slow 
pace of Turkey’s EU integration and Brussels’ decreasing appeal within Turkish 
society, the role of Ankara in the more recent Turkish Cypriot elections was not 
as extensive as before. In the Turkish Cypriot legislative elections of April 2009, 
during which the issues of the EU and solution played a considerably smaller role 
than before, the UBP reclaimed the government. A year later, the UBP’s leader 
Derviş Eroğlu replaced Talat in the Turkish Cypriot leadership and ended the short 
intermission by the pro-solution actors.
23 “Additional Protocol to the Agreement establishing an Association between the 
European Economic Community and Turkey following the enlargement of the European Union”, Official Journal of the European Union, 
30 September 2005.
24 European Commission, “Proposal for a Council Regulation on special conditions for trade with those areas of the Republic of Cyprus 
in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control”, 2004. 
25 European Commission, “Eurobarometer 62 Public Opinion in the European Union: National Report, Executive Summary, Turkey”, 
2004.
26 European Commission, “Standard Eurobarometer 73 Public Opinion in the European Union: National Report, Executive Summary, 
Turkey”, 2010.
27 David Hannay Cyprus: The Search for a Solution (London: I. B. Tauris, 2006) 
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Conclusion
Almost a decade since the negotiations on the Annan Plan, the dynamics in the 
EU-Turkey-Cyprus triangle have changed considerably and so has Ankara’s role 
in the domestic Turkish Cypriot politics. The EU accession of a divided island in 
2004 gave Greek Cypriots increased bargaining power (in the form of their partici-
pation in EU bodies) but, on the other side, added to the legitimacy of the Turkish 
Cypriots and Turkey, who, despite supporting the Annan Plan, both remain far 
away from their full European integration as members of the EU. As far as Turkey-
EU relations are concerned, the slow-down of the accession process led to a 
decrease of public interest in the EU and mediated the government’s previous 
enthusiasm about EU affairs, especially in relation to the Cyprus issue. Besides, 
the impressive external policy record of the AKP, which is indicative of Turkey’s 
emerging profile as a peripheral power, provides alternative international routes 
and makes the “carrot” of EU membership look less appealing. In this context, 
Ankara’s more compromising policy towards the Cyprus issue is expected to be 
(re)triggered by increased momentum in the Cyprus negotiations and more real-
istic prospects of full EU integration for Turkey. In this context, Brussels needs to 
perform a difficult balancing act and overcome various member states’ positions 
which remain Turkoskeptic. At the same time, momentum in the Cyprus negotia-
tions could be reinstated by the EU (as the rest of international community and 
the UN) to reach a settlement. It is anticipated that a renewed Turkish eagerness 
in resolving the Cyprus problem will also drastically affect Turkish Cypriot political 
parties, in a similar way to what was documented in the eve of the Annan Plan 
referenda. 
